Norelli, N.
December 18, 2010

The U.S. media “is not publishing the station chief’s name because he remains undercover and his name is classified…”

Welcome home, Jonathan Banks.

Here’s to working toward the goal that, in regard to outing each of your successors, the attitude in Pakistan is:

Ditto.

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Norelli, N.
01 Dec 2010

Norelli, N.
19 Nov 2010

“Offensive actions could include shutting down part of an opponent’s computer network to preempt a cyber-attack against a U.S. target or changing a line of code in an adversary’s computer to render malicious software harmless. They are operations that destroy, disrupt or degrade targeted computers or networks.”

Keith. Put down the champagne. It’s time for a question about USCYBERCOM SEO.

Now tell Ms. N in precise detail why it’s unconstitutional.
Or you’ll face grave consequences.

 Norelli, N.
16 Nov 2010

I hear there’s some entertainment brewing.

And no, silly. It’s not the marionette show. Although, I did like puppets when I was a little girl. These days, though, it takes something a little more entertaining than a puppet show to keep me amused.  Some of you guys know what I mean, right? Ok, no. Seriously. It takes something like this quote from Major General Michael J. Basla, Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command, at DOD Bloggers’ Roundtable on 8 Nov 2010:

The other thing that we’ve done, we recognize that there’s a great deal of technical competence required in cyberspace experts. And so from an officer perspective, we have mandated that 80 percent of the force come in with technical degrees before they are admitted. I think the 80 percent is right. Am I wrong on that? Well, it’s a large number. And let me just tell you, it was originally 100 percent. And that’s why I’m saying 80 percent. It was originally 100 percent. We wanted to have tech, math, science, engineering degrees. But we were advised that there are some folks that could come from the social sciences that could contribute — you know, something about looking at the problem a little differently — that could contribute to our capability. So we’ve allowed for some exceptions. And how big that exception will be, I’m not quite sure.

Now that sounds like fun: AF social scientists looking for a good time in cyberspace, contributing something “a little different”  to “capability.” I wonder who advised that. That person is an evil genius. 

 We define insider threat as malevolent (or possibly inadvertent) actions by an already trusted person in a secure environment with access to sensitive information and information systems and sources. The focus is on malevolent insiders that started out as “good guys.” The specific goal of ADAMS is to detect anomalous behaviors before or shortly after they turn. Operators in the counterintelligence community are the target end-users for ADAMS insider threat detection.

Ladies and gentlemen, Dr. Rand Waltzman at DARPA.  He’s ready for the social science  insiders. And they are ready for him.

So what do you say? USCYBERCOM Party at Peterson AFB? Keith, sir?  Multi-billion dollar budget! So I know I can count on you to bring the champagne this time. And come on, Michael, you bring your social scientists. Dr. W, you’re in charge of the algorithms.  And me? I’m in such a great mood after reading about the social scientists, I’ll just bring the liquid sunshine  if you know what I mean. But shit, I think it’s going to get confusing over there, what with the fact that there are absolutely no guiding principals as to how all this is going to work.  So someone’s going to need to bring in a couple psychiatrists to keep everyone on the straight and narrow. Because that’s a strategy that’s worked well for the U.S. military in the past. But what the fuck. Let’s give it a try. Because you never know: maybe, just maybe, it will  work. And  then we’ll all be nice and safe. Just like when we were little girls. 

Norelli, N.
7.30.10

Before.

After:

This image has been transmitted to select representatives of some the following organizations, as well as domestic concerns, as a political protest against both USCYBERCOM and Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, which the U.S. Supreme Court handed down June 21, 2010.

The United States, through USCYBERCOM,  cannot  be allowed to  police a military global information machine.